Raju sent a detailed written confession to the Satyam board itemising fabricated cash balances, non-existent accrued interest, understated liabilities, and inflated debtor positions totalling approximately $1.5 billion. The letter is a primary document in the case record.

Central Bureau of Investigation forensic auditors identified approximately 13,000 fictitious employees carried on the Satyam payroll. Salaries notionally paid to these employees were diverted to accounts controlled by Raju and associates.

Investigators identified 7,561 fake invoices raising revenue for services Satyam never provided. The invoices were used to support reported earnings figures that bore no relationship to actual operations.

S Gopalakrishnan and Srinivas Talluri of Lovelock & Lewes (PwC India) were convicted in 2015 for failing to detect or wilfully ignoring the falsified bank confirmations and supporting documents. The ICAI and SEBI imposed additional professional and regulatory sanctions.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India imposed fines and market access bans on Raju and co-conspirators following its own investigation, supplementing the criminal proceedings.

The competitive bidding process in April 2009 that resulted in Tech Mahindra's $351M acquisition demonstrated both the seriousness of the collapse and the viability of the underlying legitimate business. The acquisition price reflected the real — not inflated — asset base.

The Special CBI Court at Saket convicted Raju, his brother, the CFO, and seven others on 9 April 2015. Seven-year sentences with ₹50 million fines were imposed. The convictions are the culmination of six years of investigation and prosecution.

The Supreme Court of India in September 2017 addressed certain civil aspects of the Satyam case, including investor compensation arrangements, providing further judicial confirmation of the fraud's scope and consequences.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India found PwC India guilty of professional negligence and banned the firm, but the finding was procedural rather than evidence of coordinated cover-up. Raju's falsification of bank statements — submitting forged documents to auditors — placed the fraud at the client level. PwC's failure to independently verify cash balances with banks reflects systemic audit-quality failures common across emerging markets at the time, not a conspiracy to conceal fraud alongside management.

Tech Mahindra's 2009 acquisition and subsequent turnaround of Satyam — rebranded as Mahindra Satyam and eventually merged — demonstrated that the underlying business had genuine client relationships and operational capacity. If the fraud had been purely systemic with no real business, recovery would have been impossible. The successful turnaround suggests Raju's confession of inflating cash balances was accurate in scope: financial-statement fraud layered over a real, functioning IT services business.

Raju sent a detailed written confession to the Satyam board itemising fabricated cash balances, non-existent accrued interest, understated liabilities, and inflated debtor positions totalling approximately $1.5 billion. The letter is a primary document in the case record.

Central Bureau of Investigation forensic auditors identified approximately 13,000 fictitious employees carried on the Satyam payroll. Salaries notionally paid to these employees were diverted to accounts controlled by Raju and associates.

Investigators identified 7,561 fake invoices raising revenue for services Satyam never provided. The invoices were used to support reported earnings figures that bore no relationship to actual operations.

S Gopalakrishnan and Srinivas Talluri of Lovelock & Lewes (PwC India) were convicted in 2015 for failing to detect or wilfully ignoring the falsified bank confirmations and supporting documents. The ICAI and SEBI imposed additional professional and regulatory sanctions.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India imposed fines and market access bans on Raju and co-conspirators following its own investigation, supplementing the criminal proceedings.

The competitive bidding process in April 2009 that resulted in Tech Mahindra's $351M acquisition demonstrated both the seriousness of the collapse and the viability of the underlying legitimate business. The acquisition price reflected the real — not inflated — asset base.

The Special CBI Court at Saket convicted Raju, his brother, the CFO, and seven others on 9 April 2015. Seven-year sentences with ₹50 million fines were imposed. The convictions are the culmination of six years of investigation and prosecution.

The Supreme Court of India in September 2017 addressed certain civil aspects of the Satyam case, including investor compensation arrangements, providing further judicial confirmation of the fraud's scope and consequences.

Tech Mahindra's 2009 acquisition and subsequent turnaround of Satyam — rebranded as Mahindra Satyam and eventually merged — demonstrated that the underlying business had genuine client relationships and operational capacity. If the fraud had been purely systemic with no real business, recovery would have been impossible. The successful turnaround suggests Raju's confession of inflating cash balances was accurate in scope: financial-statement fraud layered over a real, functioning IT services business.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India found PwC India guilty of professional negligence and banned the firm, but the finding was procedural rather than evidence of coordinated cover-up. Raju's falsification of bank statements — submitting forged documents to auditors — placed the fraud at the client level. PwC's failure to independently verify cash balances with banks reflects systemic audit-quality failures common across emerging markets at the time, not a conspiracy to conceal fraud alongside management.