In 2007, the National Security Archive obtained and published declassified CIA operational documents relating to Operation Aerodynamic, including programme assessments, funding records, and descriptions of psychological warfare activities conducted through ZP-UHVR and Prolog Research Corporation.

Declassified documents confirm the CIA funded Prolog Research Corporation in New York as an overt publishing vehicle for Ukrainian-language propaganda materials directed at Soviet Ukraine and diaspora communities. Prolog's CIA funding was not publicly disclosed during its operation.

CIA internal files show the agency was aware of concerns about Mykola Lebed's wartime record — including his association with OUN-B units during a period of mass atrocities against Jewish and Polish civilians. These concerns were documented but managed rather than disclosed during his US naturalisation process.

Following reporting by New York Times journalist Ralph Blumenthal, the CIA's Intelligence Records Repository (IRR) file on Mykola Lebed was released, confirming the documented concerns about his wartime history and the agency's awareness of those concerns.

New York Times investigative journalist Eric Lichtblau's 2014 book documented the Lebed case as part of a broader pattern of US intelligence agencies protecting wartime collaborators for Cold War purposes, drawing on declassified records and interviews.

CIA's own assessments of Aerodynamic's paramilitary component — attempting to infiltrate agents into Soviet Ukraine through Bavaria — recorded the effort as largely unsuccessful. The KGB's penetration of OUN-B émigré networks was a documented counterintelligence problem throughout the programme.

Declassified documents confirm Aerodynamic continued in various forms into the post-Cold War period, reflecting the CIA's long-term investment in Ukrainian nationalist émigré networks as a tool of anti-Soviet pressure. The programme was not a brief covert action but a sustained four-decade commitment.

While CIA files document awareness of Lebed's wartime record, the full extent to which active concealment (as opposed to bureaucratic inertia or deliberate omission) occurred during naturalisation proceedings remains debated among historians. The documentary record establishes awareness; it does not fully resolve the question of intent.

Mykola Lebed's recruitment by the CIA in the late 1940s was part of a broader programme of utilising Eastern European émigré networks for intelligence collection behind the Iron Curtain — a Cold War practice that included former Nazis, Romanian Iron Guard members, and Baltic SS veterans across multiple Western intelligence services. Declassified Lebed files show CIA officers were aware of OUN-B's wartime record and made an operational judgment that his intelligence value outweighed his background. This is ethically troubling but consistent with documented US intelligence recruitment norms of the period, not evidence of a unique Ukrainian-specific conspiracy.

The characterisation of OUN-B as straightforwardly collaborationist is itself a subject of ongoing scholarly debate among historians of Ukrainian nationalism, the Holocaust in Ukraine, and Soviet historiography. Scholars including John-Paul Himka and Per Anders Rudling have documented OUN-B's involvement in anti-Jewish violence, while others including Taras Hunczak have contextualised OUN-B's relationship with Nazi Germany as opportunistic anti-Soviet alignment rather than ideological collaboration. The CIA's operational assessments of Lebed were made in a Cold War context before this historiographical debate had fully developed, making retrospective 'knew about collaborators' framing anachronistic in important respects.

In 2007, the National Security Archive obtained and published declassified CIA operational documents relating to Operation Aerodynamic, including programme assessments, funding records, and descriptions of psychological warfare activities conducted through ZP-UHVR and Prolog Research Corporation.

Declassified documents confirm the CIA funded Prolog Research Corporation in New York as an overt publishing vehicle for Ukrainian-language propaganda materials directed at Soviet Ukraine and diaspora communities. Prolog's CIA funding was not publicly disclosed during its operation.

CIA internal files show the agency was aware of concerns about Mykola Lebed's wartime record — including his association with OUN-B units during a period of mass atrocities against Jewish and Polish civilians. These concerns were documented but managed rather than disclosed during his US naturalisation process.

Following reporting by New York Times journalist Ralph Blumenthal, the CIA's Intelligence Records Repository (IRR) file on Mykola Lebed was released, confirming the documented concerns about his wartime history and the agency's awareness of those concerns.

New York Times investigative journalist Eric Lichtblau's 2014 book documented the Lebed case as part of a broader pattern of US intelligence agencies protecting wartime collaborators for Cold War purposes, drawing on declassified records and interviews.

Declassified documents confirm Aerodynamic continued in various forms into the post-Cold War period, reflecting the CIA's long-term investment in Ukrainian nationalist émigré networks as a tool of anti-Soviet pressure. The programme was not a brief covert action but a sustained four-decade commitment.

CIA's own assessments of Aerodynamic's paramilitary component — attempting to infiltrate agents into Soviet Ukraine through Bavaria — recorded the effort as largely unsuccessful. The KGB's penetration of OUN-B émigré networks was a documented counterintelligence problem throughout the programme.

While CIA files document awareness of Lebed's wartime record, the full extent to which active concealment (as opposed to bureaucratic inertia or deliberate omission) occurred during naturalisation proceedings remains debated among historians. The documentary record establishes awareness; it does not fully resolve the question of intent.

Mykola Lebed's recruitment by the CIA in the late 1940s was part of a broader programme of utilising Eastern European émigré networks for intelligence collection behind the Iron Curtain — a Cold War practice that included former Nazis, Romanian Iron Guard members, and Baltic SS veterans across multiple Western intelligence services. Declassified Lebed files show CIA officers were aware of OUN-B's wartime record and made an operational judgment that his intelligence value outweighed his background. This is ethically troubling but consistent with documented US intelligence recruitment norms of the period, not evidence of a unique Ukrainian-specific conspiracy.

The characterisation of OUN-B as straightforwardly collaborationist is itself a subject of ongoing scholarly debate among historians of Ukrainian nationalism, the Holocaust in Ukraine, and Soviet historiography. Scholars including John-Paul Himka and Per Anders Rudling have documented OUN-B's involvement in anti-Jewish violence, while others including Taras Hunczak have contextualised OUN-B's relationship with Nazi Germany as opportunistic anti-Soviet alignment rather than ideological collaboration. The CIA's operational assessments of Lebed were made in a Cold War context before this historiographical debate had fully developed, making retrospective 'knew about collaborators' framing anachronistic in important respects.