The 1973 CIA-Backed Coup in Chile

Introduction

On September 11, 1973, the presidential palace of La Moneda in Santiago, Chile was bombed by Chilean Air Force jets. Inside, President Salvador Allende — the world's first democratically elected Marxist head of state — died. The Chilean military, led by General Augusto Pinochet, seized control of the government and imposed a dictatorship that would last seventeen years, marked by the torture, disappearance, and killing of thousands of Allende supporters and political opponents.

For decades, US government involvement in the events leading to the coup was officially denied or minimised. The sustained declassification effort that followed — spanning the 1990s and accelerating after 2000 — has rendered that denial untenable. The documents that exist now are voluminous, explicit, and drawn from the CIA's own operational files, White House tape transcripts, and State Department cables.

This page documents what is confirmed, what the documents show, and where legitimate historical debate remains.

Background: Allende and the "Threat" of Democratic Socialism

Salvador Allende won Chile's September 1970 presidential election with 36.2% of the vote in a three-way race, defeating both a conservative and a Christian Democrat candidate. His Socialist-Communist coalition, the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular), proposed nationalisation of the copper industry (then dominated by US companies Anaconda and Kennecott), land reform, and expanded social programmes.

The Nixon administration's concern was not primarily about Allende's direct threat to US security. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger articulated the real anxiety bluntly in a staff meeting: "I don't see why we need to stand by and let a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves." The fear was the "contagion effect" — that a successful democratic socialist government in Chile would inspire similar movements across Latin America.

Track I and Track II: The Covert Operations

Within days of Allende's September 4 election victory, the Nixon administration launched two parallel covert programs to prevent him from taking office.

Track I (CIA-directed, State Department-aware): efforts to persuade the Chilean Congress, which under the Chilean constitution was required to confirm the leading vote-getter as president, to instead choose the runner-up. CIA officers made contact with Chilean politicians and media organisations, provided financial support to opposition press, and orchestrated a propaganda campaign describing Allende's presidency as a path to Cuban-style communism.

Track II (CIA-only, directly authorised by Nixon and Kissinger, withheld even from the US Ambassador and most of the State Department): a more radical operation explicitly aimed at provoking a military coup before Allende's inauguration. CIA Director Richard Helms took handwritten notes at a September 15, 1970 meeting with Nixon that read: "1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! / worth spending / not concerned / $10,000,000 available, more if necessary / full-time job — best men we have / make the economy scream."

A key obstacle was General René Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army and a strict constitutionalist who refused to sanction a coup. CIA Track II assets made contact with right-wing military figures and facilitated the supply of weapons for an attempted kidnapping of Schneider. On October 22, 1970, Schneider was shot during a kidnapping attempt and died three days later. US government documents show CIA asset payments to the groups involved. Allende was inaugurated on November 3, 1970.

The Three-Year Destabilisation Campaign (1970–1973)

After the failure to prevent Allende's inauguration, the US shifted to a sustained destabilisation strategy. National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (November 1970) formalised a policy of political, economic, and covert pressure. The documented elements include:

• Economic pressure: the Nixon administration blocked multilateral development bank loans to Chile and pressured US allies to restrict credit, aiming to create the economic instability Kissinger described as making "the economy scream."
• Propaganda and media operations: CIA funding of opposition newspaper El Mercurio is documented in Church Committee records. The paper ran systematic anti-Allende coverage; the CIA payments were specifically designed to prevent El Mercurio's closure.
• Labour destabilisation: CIA assets provided financial support to striking truckers in 1972 and 1973, contributing to the economic disruption that weakened the Allende government.
• Military contacts: CIA officers maintained regular contact with coup-minded Chilean military officers throughout 1970–1973. The precise extent of CIA advance knowledge of the September 11 coup is debated among historians, but the documented contact is not.

The September 11, 1973 Coup

On the morning of September 11, 1973, Chilean Army, Navy, and Air Force units moved simultaneously. The La Moneda palace was surrounded. When Allende refused to surrender, the Air Force bombed the building. Allende died during the assault; the official post-coup government declared suicide by self-inflicted gunshot, a finding confirmed by a 2011 forensic examination commissioned by his family.

Within days, thousands of Allende supporters, socialist and communist party members, trade unionists, and intellectuals were detained in the National Stadium. Torture centres were established across Santiago and the country. The bodies of some executed detainees were found in the Mapocho River. Pinochet's secret police, the DINA, subsequently conducted Operation Condor in coordination with other South American military dictatorships, tracking down and killing political exiles across the continent and in Europe.

An estimated 3,000 people were killed by the Pinochet regime; approximately 28,000 were tortured; over 200,000 were forced into exile.

The Documentary Record

The primary evidentiary basis for US involvement comes from the documents themselves:

• CIA Family Jewels (1973, declassified 2007): internal CIA compilation of potentially illegal activities, references Chile operations.
• Church Committee Report (1975): the US Senate select committee's investigation produced the most comprehensive early account of US covert activity in Chile, including Track II and the Schneider operation.
• Peter Kornbluh / National Security Archive: the most systematic declassification effort has been led by Peter Kornbluh at the National Security Archive, whose 2003 book The Pinochet File assembles hundreds of primary documents, many declassified through his FOIA requests.
• State Department FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States): the official diplomatic history series includes volumes on Chile 1969–1976 containing cables and memoranda documenting US policy.
• CIA's own retrospective history: internal CIA assessments produced in the 1970s (portions declassified) acknowledge the scope of Track II and the weapons facilitation.
• Nixon White House tapes and Kissinger transcripts: the "make the economy scream" and "save Chile" formulations are from tape transcripts and Helms's handwritten notes, not secondary accounts.

What the Confirmed Verdict Covers — and What It Does Not

The confirmed verdict applies to the following claims:

1. The US government actively worked to prevent Allende from taking office (Track I and II).
2. CIA Track II assets facilitated the kidnapping attempt on General Schneider and provided weapons to the perpetrators.
3. The US conducted a sustained multi-year destabilisation campaign including media operations, economic pressure, and labour destabilisation.
4. CIA officers maintained contact with coup-minded Chilean military figures throughout 1970–1973.

The verdict does not confirm every maximalist version of the claim. Specifically:

• The CIA did not plan or directly command the September 11 coup. The Chilean military planned and executed the coup independently. The degree of CIA advance operational knowledge of the specific date and methods is contested among historians. The CIA had years of contacts with coup plotters; it is not established that the CIA gave a green light or provided direct operational direction for the final assault.
• The Chilean military and Chilean elites had independent motives. The coup's architects — Pinochet, Air Force General Gustavo Leigh, and others — were Chilean actors with their own institutional, ideological, and class interests. Attributing the coup entirely to US direction understates Chilean agency and overstates CIA operational control.
• Not all anti-Allende activity was CIA-coordinated. Chilean business associations, landowners, some labour unions, and large parts of the Chilean middle class opposed Allende's economic policies independently of US manipulation.

Legacy and Legal Accountability

Richard Helms was convicted of perjury in 1977 for lying to the US Senate about CIA activity in Chile ("We tried to do nothing," he testified, a statement refuted by the documents). He received a two-year suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine. Henry Kissinger faced extradition requests from Spanish and French judges investigating Operation Condor; the US refused extradition. Kissinger died in November 2023 without facing judicial accountability.

Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 on a Spanish extradition warrant for human rights crimes. He was eventually returned to Chile on medical grounds in 2000 and died under house arrest in 2006 before completing any prosecution.

What Would Change Our Verdict

The confirmed verdict for documented US involvement is well-established and not subject to revision by new evidence. The scope debates — how directly the CIA directed the final coup — remain live historical questions where new documents could refine the picture.